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Monday, December 18, 2006
Before leaving for vacation I am off tomorrow for vacation in Australia. There will be no blogging for three weeks or so because I will be too busy swimming at the beach, practicing my golf and reading trashy historical romance novels. I will not be updating the 'currently reading' blurb during the vacation. I have finished "Cloud Atlas" and since finished "The Alchemist" by Paulo Coehlo. I will be reading "Norwegian Wood" by Haruki Marakumi(spelling?) on the plane. Migrant Workers' Rights in South Korea December 18 is International Migrants Day. For this event, I (and other people from my work) have been very busy preparing this little piece about migrant workers in Korea. I have not been long in the job so it was quite time-consuming to work through all the new bureaucracy to have this ready in time. On that site (not that page) you can also find the new primer on migrant workers as well as Amnesty's report on migrant workers' rights in South Korea, published in August 2006. The Diet It is still early days but there is no weight gain as yet. I found £5 on the pavement this morning so I splurged at lunch and bought the large portion instead of my regular small portion of rice and black bean casserole (Ghananian style - yum!). I couldn't finish it but I believe I gave it a good try. I bought Doritos last weekend to increase snacking and this has been mildly successful. Breakfast was a few pieces of pineapple but mostly because there was no milk for cereal. There is, of course, no need for concern. I know that there is alot of great tasting food out there and I like to think I can cook a nice meal (and great muffins). The tastebuds are willing but the stomach is overruling all food decisions at present. Maybe my stomach is allergic to food.
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Thursday, December 07, 2006
Diet Day Two I am completely sick of food. I could barely manage a few pieces of pineapple for supper last night. The doctor mentioned sandwich for supper but the thought of that much food was too much. As yesterday the lunch portion will have to be reduced due to still feeling full after breakfast. Am hoping that this will get easier soon. A friend recommended more exercise to build up an appetite - may attempt this during my vaction in Australia for Xmas where the weather is good and sunny and not icy like here. Military Sexual Slavery in Japan Sat down yesterday and read through a newsletter from Association working for the Comfort Women. I don't have it with me so I can't check the proper name or weblink. But it was quite interesting to read all the stuff going on. News to me was plans to build a War and Womens' Human Rights Museum (or similar name) in Seodaemun's Independence Park. Apparently its all approved but funding is wanting. Wednesday, December 06, 2006
The New Diet I have started a new diet - a weight gaining diet. I have been dropping kilos slowly but steadily for nearly three years and a few months ago I dropped into the 'underweight' zone of the BMI. This prompted me to visit the doctor (bloodtests to be taken later this week) who has assigned me a simple schedule to increase the number and frequency of my meals. To do this I am now having to wake up earlier in order to get an extra feed in before work (otherwise known as breakfast). I am also now going to be having nightly 'supper' after dinner and before bed. It should be noted that the weight loss was not by choice - it is more to do with having absolutely NO appetite (possibly prompted by stress - at least that is my theory). Even after eating supper last night and breakfast this morning I feel completely full and am grateful that lunch is several hours away. I got a feeling this diet isn't going to be easy. Sunday, November 26, 2006
Weekend I think it was Thanksgiving back in the US. I think this because a former student colleague flew over here for the 'long' weekend - I assume that means the Thanksgiving weekend. A small group of us went for some beers on Friday night. The group comprised two Americans and the conversation quickly got into US politics. It was a bit weird to be discussing US politics in London. Living in DC I stayed well-informed on the issue but less so over here. Saturday we went to Worthing to stay overnight at a friend's house - the main drawcard being that they have SKY and access to view the Ashes going on in Australia. We sat up to watch England batting (badly). We decided to give up and go to sleep after the second wicket fell before they had even got 100 on the board. Although I heard that English did pick up after that a bit. And on the topic, I think it is a tragedy of justice that Murdoch can put the cricket on pay-per-view and exclude so many cricket fans from being able to watch the game. That kind of monopoly should be outlawed. Tuesday, November 21, 2006
Korean TV Dramas - responding to the critics I have received a comment by Charles in the comments section and the other by Kevin about my post on Korean TV dramas. I am flattered you both read my post (but am more freaked than flattered by some of Kevin's comments). Charles notes that women also like Lost and many other American TV dramas. Absolutely, I agree. And particularly with regard to Lost, I have heard many good things about it and did not mean to imply that Lost and other US dramas are solely aiming for the male audience. My point was more generally aimed at the idea of shows being attractive to certain people and not attractive to others. Charles says "Perhaps [Korean TV drama watchers] prefer predictability because its all they ever knew". Do people who watch Korean TV dramas only like them because they don't know what else is out there? Possibly for some this is true. But generally I don't think so. I know US TV dramas. I have lived in the US, I am Australian and have spent my life watching US TV...and yet...I don't think Korean TV dramas are crappy (although they are predictable). Given their international popularity (ok - Asian popularity) would also indicate that people have choices on what they watch and choose to watch Korean TV dramas. Perhaps greater exposure to international/US TV in Korea will lead to better Korean TV production, as Charles hopes. But, using Australia as my benchmark, I see no evidence that exposure to US TV leads to better domestic programming. Kevin looks more closely at how we might compare between US and Korean TV drama to see which is best. But I remain unconvinced that this would further the discussion. You could do the comparison and find out (probably) that US TV drama is just better than Korean TV drama in every aspect. But that might only lead you to be more perplexed than ever with regard to knowing what it is that people like about Korean TV dramas. Can 'appeal' be measured, does it need much budget, does it rely on good script writing? And now I must attend to my stable of chiseled beaux-hunks. Sunday, November 19, 2006
Bad Options Should Not Become Policy Considerations A recent article out by Cato Institute's Ted Galen Carpenter appears to be his latest push to advance a proliferation strategy for Asia. He has said similar stuff in The National Interest and I suspect his co-authored book discusses his argument in more detail. He proposes that Instead of putting a leash on Japan and South Korea, U.S. officials should inform Pyongyang -- and Beijing -- that if the North insists on wielding nuclear weapons, Washington will urge Tokyo and Seoul to make their own decisions about whether to acquire strategic deterrents.It then goes on to say The United States does not need to press Tokyo and Seoul to go nuclear. That would be inappropriate. It is sufficient if Washington informs those governments that the United States would not object to their developing nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States needs to let Seoul and Tokyo know that we intend to withdraw our military forces from South Korea and Japan.To say that US need not press Japan and South Korea is erroneous. If US military were to repeal its nuclear umbrella it would be little wonder if both countries ran to fill the gap. Its like leaving the door open to the bank and swearing you had no responsibility for the subsequent and inevitable robbery. Advocating of a new type of nuclear balance of power, to me, seems odd. The US already provides a nuclear balance of power in the region already. The presence of US' nuclear umbrella negates the need for Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. If Japan and South Korea did develop nuclear weapons, how exactly would this alter the current situation, other than the absence of American military? It begs the question of whether this policy consideration is aimed at reducing tension in the region or simply withdrawing US interest in the region? The policy proposal of urging Japan and South Korea to start a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, once US has pulled out, is less to do with creating a stable region and more with extracting the US from the current mess that exists there. Such a policy would create more problems than it solves. First of all, rather than encouraging North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons, it would validate North Korea's right to have its own nuclear deterrent against a nuclear Northeast Asia. Second of all, a nuclear Japan encompasses so many more issues than simply the creation of a new balance of power structure in Northeast Asia sans US. I doubt South Korea would see itself as Japan's ally against North Korea in such circumstances, I doubt China would be so willing to pressure North Korea alongside a nuclear Japan. I strongly suspect there would be further unintended and unexpected consequences to Japan and South Korea going nuclear on US' urging. One of which would be the message it sends to the world that US decides which countries and when they should develop their own nuclear arsenal. Friday, November 17, 2006
Korean TV Dramas - love 'em or loathe 'em? Over at Big Hominid there has been some discussion about Korean TV dramas. The discussion has been quite negative. It seems that the discussants, Kevin, Charles and Gord are no fans of this genre. Some of the reasons for not liking the dramas are lack of budget, poor script, and predictability. Unless I am very much mistaken out discussants are all male (and I also think that they all grew up in the US). Not that there is anything wrong with that. I point that out only to suggest that Korean TV dramas are not aimed at US/Western males and therefore, it is hardly surprising that they do not like them. For example, I can't stand Star Trek and I have never seen 24 or Lost. I have zero desire to watch these programs based on what I understand these shows are about. They are not aimed to appeal to people like me. So while many people may praise these US TV dramas and wonder why others don't see their appeal, the same applies to Korean TV dramas. The problem lies not in the genre, but that the genre does not have you in mind. I also think it is unfair to compare Korean dramas to US dramas for two reasons. Comparing the budget of Korean TV dramas and those of US is unfair - the size of the industries are too different to criticise one for not being as good as the other. The budget issue impacts all the other criticisms made. In terms of script and the presence of logical gaps, Big Hominid has already pointed out there are plenty of US shows with logical gaps. I imagine that US and Korea are not alone in having dramas that have logical gaps. The predictability of Korean TV dramas can be viewed as a positive thing. You know exactly what you are getting - not only in terms of storyline. You can also be reassured that there will be no bad language, no real violence, and no smut (not sure that is the right word but we all know that Korean TV is far more conservative than US). And why not change the plot to viewer demand? The shows are made for the fans, listening to them makes good sense. I'd also be interested to know exactly how often that really happens. Korean TV dramas know their audience and they pander exactly to what we want to see. I think they are great.
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Tuesday, November 07, 2006
Post-Koizumi Japan Prime Minister Abe takes the top job in Japan at a very crucial time. In addition to himself, his whole cabinet is being carefully watched to gauge Japan's policy, both national and international, direction. There have been initial positive signs such as Abe's visit to China and Japan on immediately taking office. However, a friendly handshake does not mean agreement on how to deal with long-term regional spats, let alone the whole nuclear North Korea issue. Of course, Japanese officials are busy assuring the world that there is nothing to fear and a recent speech by the spokesman for the Foreign Minister is a good example. We are happy to hear that Abe is not a nationalist or a scary neo-con but rather a modern, international-savvy man-about-the-world. The nuclear debate is not a debate about whether to get nukes or not, but rather a debate about whether there should be a debate about that topic. And as for Abe's wife, she loves Korea, speaks Korean fairly well and enjoys Korean soaps. Ahhh, we can all sigh with relief.... Except for the fact that some of his words did not fully dispel concern. For example, his defnintion of 'nationalist' was far too narrow. His definition describes more a racist fanatical than a politician. But more disconcerting is the continuing disjunct between how Japanese see themselves and how other Asian countries see them. The thinker-cum-bureaucrat made a fascinating argument of "what-if-Japan-was-in-Europe" in his thought-provoking book, The Breaking of Nations.The impression I got is that Japan feels that it should be a normal country (sans nukes) and part of regional happy family if it weren't for the long-held anger that other nations hold against it - unlike Germany. But we should note that a) Japan cannot expect to be as well reconciled with former war opponents as Germany without making the same efforts and steps that Germany has made and b) Japan would not be a welcome member of the EU because all EU nations MUST abolish the death penalty and Japan refuses to do so. It is true that as the second richest nation on earth and strong democracy, it is geographically isolated from other rich democratic nations, but it is not geography which keeps Japan isolated in the region. Indeed, as a rich democracy you would think it could make friends more easily than other nations, especially with the also-rich and democratic South Koreans. The trips to China and Korea were a positive sign but it will take more than that trip and a few political speeches before Japan is viewed differently in the region. Friday, October 27, 2006
US Stands Alone on Arms Control The Control Arms Campaign has registered a major success today with the UN approving a resolution that should lead to a Arms Trade Treaty. This treaty will seek to set international standards on the trade of arms and hopefully crack down on arms flowing in conflict areas where they can cause no end of destruction and violence. The resolution received overwhelming support with 139 countries voting YES, 24 ABSENTIONS and 1 NO. The No vote was by the US. I don't the US is making any friends with that kind of attitude. The List In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C?te d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia. Against: United States. Abstain: Bahrain, Belarus, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kuwait, Libya, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen. Absent: Armenia, Bahamas, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Federated States of Micronesia, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe. Wednesday, October 25, 2006
The Nuke Made No Difference Yesterday I attended a lecture about North Korea's recent nuclear testing and its implications. It was by a Professor whose opinions I have heard before and I commented briefly on. After hearing the talk I was disappointed. The focus is, as always, on who is to blame. Whose polices toward North Korea are the least likely to work. This argument is superfluous in my opinion. South Korea looks are the US policy as being ineffective. US sees South Korean policy as naive and ineffective. US sees that China is not doing enough. Korea thinks Japan is being more of a hindrance than a help and so on and so on. This kind of discussion leads no-where. Each country in the six-party talks has important and different national interests at stake when it comes to North Korea. There is, unfortunately, insufficient cross-over of these interests that would allow for the countries to co-operate and forge a more unified approach to dealing with North Korea. And so, as I have mentioned before, if doesn't matter what North Korea does or how close it comes to the brink of war, it will never lead the other countries to develop more cooperative policy. In fact, the closer North Korea gets to war the more US will want to hit it with sticks and the more urgently South Korea will want to be to appease it. Where does this leave the six-party talks? Nowhere. The six-party talks should be abandoned. The US should continue with sanctions but should stop talking to the North. The North sees US as a threat that could attack them. US would do better if they just stepped back from North Korea.(aside from humanitarian issues). Instead, as this lecture showed, more and more the parties are resorting to bickering and finger-pointing. What a complete waste of time. Tuesday, October 17, 2006
What IS their Game? It seems that no matter what North Korea did in the past there were always pundits, experts and ordinary Joes who thought they knew the real motives behind North Korea's actions. It was a call for help, or a trick to get more money, or a ploy to delay progress, or something. I too always felt that, even though I may not really know the true motives driving North Korea's actions, there was essentially some plan that North Korea was following. Now I have to question that assumption. Lets step back to the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans signed on the framework in 1994 but we now know that they did not keep their side of the bargain. As the Agreed Framework died a messy death the North Koreans worked in earnest to develop nuclear weapons regardless of world opinion. In the meantime they also attended the six-party talks aimed at halting their nuclear program. They attended under duress and called constantly for bi-lateral talks with the US, which they did not get. And then, just as things were plodding along endlessly with lots and rhetoric and little action, North Korea exploded what they tell us was a nuclear weapon. Predictably this led to sanctions. And now North Korea is labelling the sanctions as an act of war. Surely North Korea would have predicted beforehand that the outcome of the nuclear test would be sanctions. Surely by declaring sanctions as an act of war, the rest of the world would expect North Korea to declare war right back at us. But instead, they declare sanctions as an act of war and then prepare to do another, less than impressive, nuclear test. Is North Korea trying to look like a master of calm and restraint by not fighting back against the world's acts of aggression (ie: sanctions)? Or, more likely, are they holding back because they do not want to fight the world (I say 'world' to show that it was a UN resolution and not a US thing). In which case why declare the sanctions as an act of war? Why not play down the impact of sanctions? North Korea does not want to talk, either in the six-party forum, or even bi-laterally in my opinion. Nor does it want to go to war because it knows it will be destroyed. They don't seem to want peace and they don't seem to want war (at least they don't want a war they would lose). And now it finds itself in a very strange situation where it has gone so close to the brink that anything they say now needs to be backed by action. Testing another nuclear weapon seems is a pointless exercise, but it seems that these days pointless words and pointless gestures are all North Korea can do. They don't even know what they want. Wednesday, October 11, 2006
Nuclear Fallout - The first casualty It seems that dissension among the ranks has led to the collapse of The Korea Liberator. It would appear that the recent events in North Korea and how they should be handled has led to 'irreconcilable differences'. I guess that North Korea can cause regime collapse too. Fortunately, the end of the KL does not see the end of the authors. Joshua, we are told, will return to One Free Korea; and Richardson will return to DPRK Studies. I note that I do not have that on my blogroll. I will try to remember to rectify that on the weekend. Speaking frankly, I loved the KL. I don't think there was a single post, apart from the 'North Korea in the News' segments, that I agreed with. I usually departed the site feeling a mixture or outrage, contempt and mirth. And in the words of the great Bill Waterson, as spoken through my hero, Calvin, "Shock and titillate me just don't ever bore me". The KL was never boring. Tuesday, October 10, 2006
In other news... The North Korea nuclear test, if it indeed happened, must surely go down as one of the most successful PR events in history. The timing was absolutely impeccable - it has totally blitzed any other news that would otherwise have come out of Korea. Sadly, most of what we are reading in the papers is not anything to do with the North Korean nuclear test. Rather, it is speculation by pundits on what they think is going to happen in reaction to the test. This is done because the person who guesses right can then enjoy the right to say 'I told you so' and the bigger benefit of having people believe you are wise and insightful. What the hell, I'll give it a go myself: South Korea will formally downgrade the Sunshine Policy (or whatever its current name is) by stopping or reducing visible exchanges but still maintain humanitarian aid and all the other exchanges that are going on under the radar. China will side with US and the others to pass a UN Security Council resolution and join in sanctions (but maybe not oil and not humanitarian food aid). Japan will be calm and follow the lead of China and US so as not to completely destroy recent efforts of being more buddy-buddy with China and Korea. US will huff and puff and nobody will care. So now we can get on to more interesting stuff. Ban Ki Moon has been approved to become the new UNSG. My absolute favourite headline was Despair at UN over selection of 'faceless' Ban Ki Moon. That'd certainly take the wind out of your sails. Ban won't start the job until the new year so at least Kofi Annan can handle the immediate North Korea crisis and avoid the allegations of bias that Ban will likely incur when he takes office. But the news that should have been big in Korea today but was overshadowed is that today is World Day Against the Death Penalty. In particular, the event marked the launch of a new Anti-Death Penalty Asia Network. This is a network of NGOs and human rights activist groups throughout Asia who are dedicated to the abolition of the death penalty in Asia. The launch was held in Seoul to urge the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee to support the Special Bill to Abolish the Death Penalty. Saturday, October 07, 2006
Where on Earth has Kathreb Been? Its been a while since I blogged. I almost feel guilty but it has been an exceptionally busy time. The first distraction was an abandoned kitten which we picked up about six weeks ago. We discovered that she was blind and had a slight neurological twitch. It would appear that once the owner discovered this, they abandoned her. This caused much stress in our little share house in London. My sister and I adamantly refused to deliver the kitten to a shelter unless we could get a guarantee that she would not be put down. There was much debate in the house on how to handle the situation and things got a little strained. Fortunately everything was resolved when we finally found a shelter that could give us the guarantee we needed. The other main distraction has been a month-long visit from my parents. Their visit included a trip to Scotland and then a tour to various villages around the UK visiting relatives. It also meant long days being a tourist around London and then home and having to cook for four people. Next was the career front. I started a new job at the end of September. However, it is only a short-term contract so I am still having to keep looking for work for when the contract finishes. There is no hope of extension. Job interviews are getting much more stressful. The job I got involved a forty-minute interview and a one hour test. Another interview I had included a presentation, interview and one and a half hour test. The preparation for these interviews took up much of the time that would otherwise have been spent blogging. Most of this is now behind me so I am hoping that my schedule will settle down a little and I can return to regular blogging. There have been a lot of things going on the IKK that I would've liked to have added my two cents but didn't have time. But with the North Koreans about to test a nuclear weapon and Ban Ki Moon set to become the new UNSG there seems to be plenty of interesting stuff coming up worth blogging about. Wednesday, August 23, 2006
Migrant Workers and Speaking Freely Migrant Workers in Korea are the focus of a campaign by Amnesty International. In August 2003 the Korean National Assembly passed the Act Concerning the Employment Permit for Migrant Workers (EPS Act). The Act prohibits discrimination against foreign workers and was intended to give migrant workers legal status and to put an end to human rights violations against them. By passing the Act, South Korea became the first labour importing country in Asia to attempt to protect the rights of migrant workers through legislation.Sadly, having a law and enforcing it are two quite distinct things and the (lengthy) report outlines the many failings of the South Korean government to ensure that human rights standards are met for immigrant workers. If that report is too much to read, the Wire, a publication by Amnesty, has an nice succint article on the same issue. The article runs with a heartbreaking quote from a young Chinese migrant's suicide note: "Migrant workers are also human beings. Why don't they pay for my work? I cannot go home because I don’t have money. I have chosen to kill myself as there is no other way."Speaking Freely: The Asia Times, Speaking Freely column has a an interesting article by Kim Koo associate in research at the Korea Institute, Harvard University, Sung Yoon-Lee. [Roh and Kim] both believe that North Korea has a right to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense, as it faces "external threats". As a corollary, both believe that the seven-rocket salute on July 5 (July 4 in the US - Independence Day) was a mere "political gesture" or a "routine military exercise of a sovereign nation".Very readable, interesting stuff. Of course I do not necessarily agree with it all (or perhaps, at all). I think many of the statements lack proper clarification. For example, I don't think that Roh views the United States as the "ultimate enemy". But I do like that someone took the title of the column seriously enough to produce such an essay. Wednesday, August 16, 2006
Debating the Structure of the Alliance is Good US Ambassador Vershbow has some well timed words regarding the ROK plans to gain self-reliant defence capability saying that it will bolster the alliance. Contrary to popular belief these two aims are mutually reinforcing. It makes sense for Korea to gain greater control in watching and deterring North Korea. The shift also benefits the US leaving them better positioned to be able to credibly deter other global trouble spots. Despite the too-public bickering among South Korea officials and military (retired and current) the Alliance is not in such a state that we need think it is imminently about to collapse. Nor, indeed, that the democratic process in Korea is about to be waylaid by a "c" word! I have not studied the nature of coups or the indicators for predicting imminent social upheaval, but I am pretty sure that 'disgruntled former holders of powers speaking out against the current administration' is more indicative of a strong democracy in which people know they can utilise their freedom of speech. The rumblings in the Alliances are controversial and important. The amount of public debate is a good sign, not a bad one. Monday, August 14, 2006
Abolition Legislation - A two-step process Independence Day in Korea, as usual, is being met with Presidential pardons for criminals. In this case, the list of lucky crooks includes Ahn Hee-jung, Yeo Taek-su and former Uri Party lawmaker Shin Geh-ryoon. These criminals are all guilty of accepting illegal political funds. As both The Party Pooper and the Korea Times rightly point out, letting these people go is a gross miscarriage of justice. From no angle can this be viewed as anything but blatant political cronyism and a gross violation of the spirit of the law. Letting these criminals out also reduces faith in the justice system. This is critically important at this juncture because Korea is seeking to abolish the death penalty. I think the bill is due to go before the National Assembly in September or October. Parliamentarian Yoo In Tae is heading the campaign in the National Assembly to abolish the death penalty. Mr. Yoo himself was sentenced to death after being tortured and was imprisoned on death row for four and a half years before being released. Of those who were also sentenced to death with him, eight were executed. Their cases are currently being re-tried in the Supreme Court on strong evidence that they are innocent. South Korea hasn't executed anyone since 1997. Abolishing the death penalty relies heavily on the public having faith in the justice system to convict and punish criminals. Even, though criminals with life sentences, should/would (?) be exempt of being elegible for the amnesty, the question is one of faith that justice will be served at all times, in all cases. Having Presidential amnesty that is habitually abused to set free cronies undermines the justice system’s ability to maintain respect for the rule of law. There can be no credibility in the law if one man/woman has the power to overturn any decision and set free criminals without concern for guilt or the danger they present to society, or respect for the victims of their crimes. The public should demand that the abolition of the death penalty should be preceded by abolition of the Amnesty law. Wednesday, August 09, 2006
Prelude There has been so much noise in the IKK of late bad-mouthing South Korea. South Korea has isolated itself, they say, against its allies and those who would view North Korea as an imminent threat. South Korea is going to be sorry, they say, for straining relations in the US-ROK Alliance. It has always been the case that the IKK leaned more toward a hard-line view but the recent echoes bouncing off the walls lead one to think that there is no-one with a dissenting view. Yet, I disagree with most of what is being said out there. Here are some of my views: South Korea did the right thing in cutting aid to North Korea but not condemning them. Engagement with North Korea was a good idea before the missile crisis and remains a good idea. It is impossible for South Korea to be isolated over North Korea - anything any country is trying to achieve with North Korea directly impacts the South. I shudder to think of the animosity that would erupt if US caused North Korea's implosion and then expected the South to step in and unify on call. Unification must happen under the agreed terms of both Koreas or else it is going to be horribly ugly. I think sanctions are a waste of time with absolutely no financial or rhetorical value against a country that voluntarily chooses isolation. And, I think the ex-defence ministers proclaiming doom and gloom for the US-ROK Alliance are exaggerating the problem and just vying for a bit of attention. In sum, I am sick of the negativity that undervalues South Korea's ability and its right to pursue its own interests and policies. The opinions of the increasingly loud, right-wing blogs in the IKK are not shared by this blog. And John Bolton is ridiculous twat with less diplomatic skills than foul-smelling roadkill. Wherefore the Negativity? The US-Korea Alliance is undergoing a period of transition. The US has announced its intention to reduce its forces on the peninsula and reposition its bases. This is in accordance with broader US military shifts to become more fleet-of-foot on a global scale. In light of reduced forces, Korea is seeking to gain self-reliance defence capabilities. On the surface these would appear to be mutually reinforcing activities that should lead to easy cooperation. Alas, social and political forces have combined to make the road ahead pitted with obstacles that are threatening the existence of the alliance. The US desire to reduce its forces in Korea is part of a broader plan to restructure is global military posture. Greater mobility is seen as a way for US forces to quickly be deployed to any variety of trouble spots that may erupt throughout the Asia region (or globally). Such a move would put the US-Korea alliance on a par with similar alliances such as with that with Australia and other nations. The premise for these alliances is a recognition of shared values that are worth defending. This view is very far removed from the traditional rationale of the US-Korea alliance, which is isolated in perspective to deterring North Korea and defending the South. Reducing forces in Korea is symptomatic of tectonic changes in the nature of the relationship between US and Korea. Rather than be pushed, as some South Koreans view it, into transforming the alliance in a way that does not suit national interests, South Korea would be better served by becoming self-reliant in its defence capabilities. This way, if the US gets involved in a conflict or crisis outside the Korean peninsula, South Korea would not be obliged to get involved. This shows a certain amount of ingratitude toward the US which has stood ready to defend South Korea in a second for the last 50-odd years. On the other hand, continuing the alliance in a format that suits nobody is not the answer either. The road to change may not look very bright, but it is not impossible. The end result might actually be better than the current situation. For South Korea, change means gaining OPCON and significantly improving its C4I, a process which will take a great deal of time and money. Many nay-sayers to South Korea's plans for self-reliance emphasise that South Korea would be unable to maintain the same level of defence that US provides for them. That may be very true, but it is too simplistic in its analysis of the situation. The first problem is the tendency to measure what South Korea needs to deter/defend against, North Korea vis-a-vis what US has amassed to do that job. No country on this earth has the military capability of the US nor likely to get near it anytime soon. South Korea does not need to be as powerful and technologically advanced as the US in order to deter North Korea. South Korea does, however, need to be more prepared for the job than it currently is. This will take a lot of money. South Korea spends over $21 billion annually on its military compared to North Korea's $5 billion odd. South Korea plans to boost its military budget to 3% of GDP, up from its current level of 2.6%. Concerns are that there is not in place any 'guarantee' that the increased military budget will be approved in the budget process on an annual basis over the long term. This concern, though it is worth voicing, lacks credibility. It is not reasonable to expect South Korea to earmark funding for the military budget by placing its approval exempt from the existing budgetary approval process. Furthermore, extensive reforms in the Korean budgeting process make the stability of military funding more likely than ever. Korea's move to adopt program budgeting, aims to ensure that all government priorities will be given adequate funding. Other reforms, such as the new medium-term expenditure framework, will be used identify and accommodate for long-term funding needs. This does not guarantee the military budget will be met as needed, but it does show that practical steps toward stable budgetary funding are being made. With proper, stable funding there is no reason why South Korea can't upgrade its capabilities to what is needed over time. The key concern is whether they can be self-reliant in the crucial C4I area at the time that US hands over the controls. The experts predict that they will not be ready. This should not cause delays in the hand over, however, for one key reason: South Korea will never be completely ready to take the controls prior to handover. Moreover, handing over OPCON does not equate with complete US withdrawal of support for the defence of South Korea. Change should occur with a view that South Korea will learn and improve on the job. US should support the transition and the development of South Korea's capabilities with explicit backing in the early stages of hand over. This will have the benefit of helping Korea become self-reliant while also ensuring that North Korea has no doubts that South Korea is well defended during the transition. The timing of these changes is of critical concern. The current plan, many say, is far too fast to allow South Korea to develop the initial capabilities it will need. The South Korean defence ministry prefers a 2015-20 vision but chances are that change could come as early as 2009. The difference of years is massive in terms of what Korea needs to achieve. Despite the strained relations between the US and Roh Administration, it would be surprising if the change did actually occur in 2009. There is an election coming up in South Korea before then. And like all plans regarding the US military in Korea and South Koreas defence capabilities everything is likely to get delayed. Amidst all the negativity suggesting that South Korea is going down a terrible path that will leave it isolated and undefended, it is worth bearing in mind that Korea has already proved that it can do whatever it determines to do. South Korea has the ability to surprise us all. Friday, August 04, 2006
North Korea The missiles have been test-fired and the UN Resolution has passed - North Korea is the bad guy. Japan pushed for a hard response and got fairly close to what it wanted. US supported the tough response option and sanctions are being imposed. South Korea did not support such a move but it did cut off aid (although not emergency relief aid). And China went along with the resolution and all. But such a stance of (semi) unity is bound to be temporary. Enter the floods that have reportedly devastated North Korea (again). China supported the UN Resolution in the end and, it turns out, they also froze North Korean assets last year. This might suggest that China is tiring of North Korea's antics. And to some extent that is probably true. After all, China's own interests will always trump North Koreas. However, just because China may not always help/aid/defend North Korea, doesn't mean they are siding with the US. While China might be willing to crack down occasionally, the recent floods are not likely to be ignored by China.It is in China's interest that North Korean victims of the floods do not try to escape into China. Preventing such an outcome would mean providing more assistance and more support to the regime's survival. 'Wave of refugeess' trumps 'frozen assets' in terms of things you don't want to happen to your nation. In fact, the recent floods may well reposition North Korea's image back to "humanitarian crisis" from "nuclear desperado" and lead to a more vocal role for civil and humanitarian groups. Sunday, July 30, 2006
Help the Economy: Have a Baby - a rant on birth-encouragement policies The birth-rate in South Korea is at a record low. As one of the most densely populated nations in the world, some would be forgiven for thinking that population decline might actually be a good thing. But apparently that is not the case. The South Korean government is very concerned about this trend and is planning to spend 32 Trillion won to boost the birth-rate. The money will be spent of a variety of initiatives designed to 'ease the burden of child-rearing'. I find that phrase particularly amusing because the policies are aimed at those women who are more likely to view child-rearing in a more positive light rather than label it a burden. Just as a quick aside: Cathartidae has a short post on Bada's contribution to this effort. Her idea, like the government's ideas, are likely to lead to very little. I find public policy addressing birth-rates to be an endlessly fascinating topic. Here you have a bunch of suited old men with little financial woes lamenting the economic repercussions of an aging population combined with low birth rates. These are the men (in Korea I think we can assume the main policy makers are men) drafting policies to encourage women to start having children earlier and to have more of them. Their concern for families wanting children and women's views on child-rearing are limited to their own myopic economic perspective. I'm not saying their policy prescriptions are bad. I think they are neutral. My own knowledge of women who want children is that these policies have very little impact, if any, in the decision-making process of when to have children and how many. The issue I have here is one of motivation. I think that spending money of childcare facilities and such are a good idea. But the motive behind the policy is wrong. Cheaper and better childcare facilities should be aimed at allowing women (and families) greater choice and freedom in this area. That is, the option for women to go back to work or to stay home, to work part-time or full-time, to take time off and return later to work or whatever. The idea of having better childcare facilities with the aim of ensuring that women can return to the workforce for the economic good of the nation is insulting. The problem I have is not the policy, it is the policy-makers idea of what the 'problem' is. I don't isolate Korea in this. Australia's 'baby bonus' I thought, was highly offensive. My gripe is that these policies are not designed with the aim of granting women (and families) greater freedom to choose how and when they raise a family. They are designed to "boost the birth-rate". If there is an economic impact to reduced birth-rates surely a better option is to find out how the economy can adjust. I have yet to see a government report that looks at the savings (long-term obviously) of a lower population on public and natural resources compared to the cost of having to first pay for the aging population (pension and care for the elderly costs). I think its time to accept that many women (and families) in modern society just don't want children and that government policy should try to reflect that reality rather than try and change it. Friday, July 28, 2006
My Shoes I bought these shoes back in January of this year but only managed to wear them for the first time this week. Part of the reason for hesitating was that I feared they would be too uncomfortable to walk in (ie: they would be good only to wear in the office when one is sitting all day). However, I finally decided it was time to put them to the test. I took them out on Wednesday and we did quite a bit of walking together. Although I certainaly wouldn't want to go hiking in them, they were not as uncomfortable as I had feared. In fact, they weren't too bad at all. I bought them as part of my effort to wear high heels more often rather than my typical cluncky hiking boots or joggers. And because they are beautiful. Shoes, I think I love you. 
They Say the Neon Lights are Bright in Broadway This is not true of Broadway, UK however. We recently made a short trip up to this extremely pretty town in late June. It sits on part of the Cotswold Way making it a great location for walking. I have some pictures of our stay:  This is the Broadway Country Park leading up to Broadway Tower. Its a bit of a steep walk but well worth the effort as the views are nice and the country air is lovely. You can access Broadway Tower by a shorter, less pretty path (or drive) but that detracts from the whole country feel of the area. The Country Park also features red deer, which can be seen here lazing under a tree. It was a rather warm day and we had reached the Tower late in the morning when it was reaching the hottest part of the day so it is understandable that they are not frolicking in the fields. This is Broadway Tower, a three-turreted folly built by the Earl of Coventry. The Earl was the founder of the North Cotswold Hunt (fox hunting) and the folly was built so that he could look over Broadway, the headquarters of the Hunt and the surrounding countryside. The view from the top allows one to see 12 counties on a clear day. And finally, a picture of the garden at Snowshill Manor. The Manor houses a great collection of amazing knickknacks collected by its last owner, Charles Wade. The rooms display full sets of Japanese armour as well as a large collection of the old 'boneshaker' bicycles with the HUGE front wheel and small back wheel.
Saturday, July 22, 2006
North Korean Missles, the Iranian twist The diplomatic bickering has hotted up since the UN Security Council condemned the North for tet firing several missiles. Hard-liners, loudest in the K-blogosphere being The Korea Liberator, advocate sanctions as a step in the right direction. The more jingoistic among them are even going so far as to call for pre-emptive strikes. This view is in stark contrast to those more in favour of a more pragmatic response; or indeed a business-as-usual response. The latest news that I've come across is that Iranian officials were present to witness the missile test. I have to admit to being a bit skeptical about this information. It may be true, but why is it just coming out now; surely this was known before-hand. And were there officials from other countries or no? And if they were there, what does it mean? And it just seems oh-so convenient that US' two most hated countries are caught in such a situation. All I'm saying is that this information only leads to more questions. I am willing to recognise that this information may have come out earlier and I just didn't notice. Tuesday, July 11, 2006
North Korea Missiles A diplomatic storm is brewing over how to deal with North Korea. Both China and South Korea have criticised Japan as over-reacting. Christopher Hill is in Beijing and has voiced the idea of excluding North Korea from future talks. Beijing is sending an envoy to North Korea. Japan is drumming up support for a sanction-approving resolution in the UN which is currently thought to have US, France and UK backing. It is unlikely that such a resolution could be passed though due to reluctance by China and Russia to take a hard-line. It is hardly surprising that South Korea and China started having a hissy fitt at Japan. Any military stance directed toward an area of land as well-trodden by the feet of Japanese soldiers as North Korea is clearly going to be unpopular. But the gap between US/Japan voting for tough response versus Korea/China voting for more discussion has clearly widened. The patience of the Japan and US is clearly running dry. There are quite of lot of editorials and such being printed analysing whether the missiles have had the desired outcome for North Korea. Some say it has been a failure and put them in a worse position, others suggest that events have gone in their favour. None of this makes much sense to me because for now, apart from a few diplomatic words, nothing has actually happened. Thursday, July 06, 2006
North Korea Tests Missiles North Korea has test fired some missiles and is vowing to keep doing so. I'm fairly certain that there is more being written on this topic than I care to ever read about so I have limited myself to just reading the ny times article (above) and Slate. As someone who blogs predominantly about Korea some might think that I am being lax in my duty by not reading more. And those people would be right. But there is also the point that I don't believe that this round of tests is going to do anything other than create a bit of media hoo-ha and a bit of rhetoric from politicians. Then it will fade away from the new papers and becomes just one more item to list when journal articles recite all the belligerent and brinkmanship antics of North Korea - ho hum, here we go again. Not because this isn't a threatening act but its been tried before. There is nothing to be done about it. North Korea is trying to get US and others to do its bidding but this is a complete waste of time because Japan, Korea, US, China etc can't achieve anything against North Korea, whether it be engagement or isolation, until they agree on an approach and tossing a couple of missiles into the ocean doesn't change that fact. Monday, June 26, 2006
Australia out of World Cup Unfortunately Australia has been beaten by a bad reffing decision and is out of the World Cup. Italy won with a last minute penalty shot ending an exciting game with a disappointing anti-climax. This tops off a bad week in football - first was the embarrassment of the Australia v Croatia game which turned into a farce then South Korea's failure to get into the second round when the lines man's flag was overruled. The ref's decision to overrule was above board and Korea knows to play by the whistle but it did all happen very quickly and it left a bad feeling. So with Korea and Australia both out in rather disappointing circumstances I probably won't bother watching the rest of the tournament. Given that four years ago the reffing was terrible and this year it is still terrible I can only hope it improves between now and 2010. Friday, June 16, 2006
Panel III. The R.O.K.'s Self-Reliant Military Policy and the CFC: Replacing the Armistice Below are the summaries for Session III of the Brookings Seoul-Washington Forum. Kim Dong Shin Former Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea Meeting Challenges in Transforming the Alliance Prudently This article focuses on the challenges to changing the nature of the security alliance. It examines both the possible reduction and repositioning of US forces as well as the possibility of increased role and responsibility of South Korean forces in the defence of the peninsula. The main policy recommendation for this is to establish a political advisory council to create new values for the alliance. He argues that there needs to be more done to create mutual agreement on what the alliance is trying to achieve and how this can done in order to avoid rifts and distractions such as the death of the two school girls and the mess it created for the alliance because it separated US and South Korea in enemy camps rather than being something they needed to handle together. Deterrence and defense need to be supplemented by a new vision of peaceful coexistence and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. Devaluing and mistrusting the alliance should end in Seoul, while impatience and anger about South Korean new elite and questions raised by them should end in Washington. Therefore, the two countries need to begin two plus two dialogue between Defense Minister and Foreign Minister of the Korean side and Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State on the US sideThe body of the paper is rather dull but it ends strongly with a clear conclusion and by emphasizing the need for public diplomacy on both sides to educate the public on what the alliance is there for and why it is important. I think this is the first paper that has actually outlined steps that both sides can be taking to strengthen the alliance. John Tilelli, Jr. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Cypress International Inc. and Former Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command, US-ROK Combined Forces Command This is a transcript taken from the presentation implying that he did not prepare a paper and spoke with only talking points. Tilelli mainly discusses the idea of when OPCON for ROK forces will be given back to Korea. In this he focuses on how and why that decision should be made arguing that rather than being event-driven it should be time-lined with clear ideas on what capabilities need to be identified in the ROK to know that it is the time to make the change. This means money/investment, C4ISR(command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) modernization, and agreeing on the role of the US forces. He also talks about how such a move will alter the dynamics of the US-ROK relationship indicating that US forces would move to a supporting role to the ROK command. Hamm Taik-Young Professor of Political Science, Kyungnam University The Self-reliant National Defense of South Korea and the Future of the US-ROK Alliance Self-reliance depends on more than just military build-up according to this article. Looking back South Korea has long aspired to be self-reliant from certain points of view but in reality it has not set out the necessary path needed to allow for South Korea to become a fully self-reliant military power capable of defending its nations interests, be that against North Korea or a different threat that may arise in the future. the reform requires indigenous strategic planning and possibly a future defense posture without the USFK. Arms build-ups themselves are not an answer to the call for self-reliance. While South Korea has embraced the goal of self-reliant defence for more than three decades, the dependent mentality in national security has not changed considerably. The foundation of self-reliance is the consciousness of autonomy, responsibility, creativity for a long-term vision, and a wider consensus of and support from the people.He then goes on to discuss broader implications of ROK self-reliance and the need for a broader peace regime in North East Asia to avoid an arm's race. He rejects the idea of Korea as a neutral or buffer country between US and China or Japan and China and stresses instead multilateral security cooperation to avoid polarization between US and China or Japan and China, which could leave Korea uncomfortably positioned. Bruce Bechtol, Jr. Associate Professor of International Relations, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Planning for Change in the ROK-US Alliance: Challenges and Implications Bechtol outlines two key challenges in Korea's plan to gain 'independent capability' in defense by 2020; finance and transformation. In finance he is concerned that Korea has not clearly outlined how they will guarantee the necessary increase in the defense budget from President to President. In discussing the transformation he makes similar comments to the previous paper that self-reliance requires a shift form having complimentary capabilities to the US to developing capabilities and an outlook on defense which it currently doesn't really have. That is to say that rather than build up weapons Korea needs to be able to take over intelligence and other skilled areas currently handled by the US forces. The question that was not adequately answered for me in this paper was: does South Korea need to be as strong as the US to be considered ready to defend itself against North Korea? All the comparisons were against what the US has in terms of capability and I think we all agree that US outclasses North Korea well beyond a level needed to deter or defeat North Korea. And also, does South Korea need to have everything it needs before it can be seen capable of defending itself or can it be a more gradual process with South Korea getting to a minimal level and then building more capability on a long-term time-line. In all, even though it is prudent to discuss openly the challenges facing both South Korea, the US and the alliance in the event of Korea taking OPCON, I felt the analysis was too pessimistic and short on practical solutions. Monday, June 12, 2006
3-1 Australia won against Japan by 3 goals to 1!! We scored all three goals in the final 11 minutes of the game which was a bit hair-raising for us spectators but the result is what counts. We are AWESOME. Sunday, June 11, 2006
World Cup 2006 The World Cup has started. It harldy seems like four years since I was in Korea for the occasion. This time around though Australia is playing. (Hooray!) It is also good because Australia has hired former South Korean coach Gus Hiddink. Of course that does not guarantee that Australia will do as well as Korea did but I like Gus, I think he's a good coach who cares about his players. It doesn't matter much how Australia does this time round. The point is that we made it to the World Cup and I expect our team will make more regular appearances from now on. I think there is a tendency in Australia to believe that we are the greatest sporting nation. It doesnt fit that we haven't won the World Cup but the growing popularity of the game in Australia might be the start of great things to come. This is just the beginning. Australia plays its first match (against Japan) tomorrow. Korea will play Togo for its first game the following day (June 13). Saturday, June 10, 2006
More on the Seoul - Washington Forum I have now summarised Session II. The Six-Party Talks: Moving Forward of the Seoul - Washington Forum held in Washington DC in early May. From the papers I am judging this was quite a corker of a session with speakers having polarised views on the six-party talks and what should be happening. This summary of papers also concludes day one of the two-day conference - half way! Session II - The Six-Party Talks: Moving Forward Chang Sun-Sup Chairman of the Executive Board, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization The Unfinished Project: The Significance of the LWR Project The title pretty much gives the argument away as the author outlines a history of the decline of the project and why it is important that it not be left to die. In the historical review, while not laying blame, he favours the perspective that North Korea, US and Japan were happy to let KEDO dwindle while South Korea fought valiantly for its survival. The trio of countries did not let it flounder without cause however, and he runs through events that prompted these countries to withdrawal their support. In the US, the lack of North Korean cooperation and announcement by North Korea of their HEU program was pretty much an end to their support, while for Japan the whole 1998 test missile and abductees issue curbed their enthusiasm. He goes on to point out that good things have come from the LWR project despite its failure. The interaction between South and North Korean workers and North Korea's exposure to South Korean technology is viewed as a plus regardless of the projects ultimate lack of progress. And that given the work already done and the impasse in the current six-party talks there may yet be a way for the LWR project to be resuscitated. The weakness of the paper is in the lack of footnotes or supporting information that would more directly show how South Korea struggled to keep KEDO alive as the US and Japan were withdrawing. Speaking as someone from KEDO who has direct involvement in the project, I think, does give him some freedom to explain events from his own view in the thick of things rather than relying on other sources, but not in explaining how fluctuations in the international political environment influenced, and was affected by, policy changes. David Asher Adjunct Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses The Illicit Activities of the Kim Jong-Il Regime This paper covers the illicit activities of counterfeit currency, drug smuggling, weapons trade, and smuggling of sanctioned items. There is quite a bit of interesting information about North Korea's (alleged) illicit activities in these different areas, especially the Royal Charm operation. To combat these threats, the US adopted the Illicit Activities Operation (IAI), which sounds like the policy to curb and intercept suspected DPRK trades/smuggling. The argument being that these efforts run parallel (and complement?) the six-party talks by showing the DPRK that US won't stand for such nonsense. The paper ends with some policy implications for the US: a) continue the IAI crackdown on DPRK's illicit activities; b) closer monitoring and interception where necessary of DPRK boats to prevent proliferation and weapons sales; c) strong law enforcement against DPRK should strangle their economy and make them more pliable; so incentives should not be aimed at propping at the existing dodgey economy; d) DPRK should shift direction toward a 'bold switchover' and e) US should be ready to provide full support to assist North Korea's new approach. Although it is not very clear I think the argument is that the Six-party talks must work in within a broader framework of dealing with North Korea, which includes strict law enforcement of illicit activities. In the paper the six-party talks are not really mentioned which is disappointing given the topic of the session. I also think that policy implication (d) is not for the US and should not have been mentioned in that context. And the question remains: can a crack-down on illicit activities work in parallel with the six-party talks; is the impact negative, positive or neutral. This paper clearly saw it as positive. Paik Haksoon Director of Inter-Korean Relations Studies Program, The Sejong Institute; Executive Director, Seoul-Washington Forum What is to be done for the North Korean Nuclear Resolution? This is a rather provocative paper. The main assessment seems to be figuring out who is to blame for the current lack of progress. The blame rests squarely on the US while poor South Korea is seen as the one who clearly has the most to lose by a nuclear North Korea: Other six-party talks participant states appear to have been disillusioned by now at the lack of United States' political will, ability, and leadership in achieving nonproliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons programs. They are questioning the assumption of the U.S. policy that joint pressure on North Korea will make North Korea give in and the validity of the U.S. judgment that the reason North Korea has not surrendered until now is just because there has not been enough pressure on North Korea in one coherent voice. South Korea and China demand that the United States exercise flexibility. They are asking where U.S. leadership is.He sees that US inflexibility limits the options available to the parties to induce North Korea to freeze, or dismantle, their nuclear program. He clearly sees the sanctions as being negative. In noting the joint statement in late 2005, the author blames sanctions (probably that whole IAI thing) as squandering any progress made on the diplomatic front. The way forward is to find incentives that will get North Korea to cooperate, not to wear them down. The idea of collectively putting pressure on North Korea is viewed as a bad one. He argues that while the US calls for more pressure and more time for the pressure to take effect on North Korea they have more time to build up their weapon’s programme. In a bit of switch, the US is seen as being the country adopting a muddle-through policy and as being too burdened by ideological constraints: [A] problem associated with the United States' muddling-through policy applied to the North Korean nuclear problem when it is pursued in the absence of any effective problem-solving means has to do with the fact that the neoconservatives and ultra rights in Washington, D.C. are disproportionately under the heavy influence of their ideological and philosophical thrust and impulse in dealing with the practical policy issues. This ideology-laden policy making does not help them fully grasp the fundamentals of how real politics and policy making are conducted in the North Korean political system. The U.S. policy toward North Korea in the North Korean nuclear problem is a case of an excess of ideology and ignorance combined.He concludes by offering some policy recommendations: a) provide North Korea with security assurances and think more seriously about a policy that includes carrots instead of only sticks; b) US should engage in bi-lateral talks with DPRK either separate or within the six-party framework; c) North Korea should be offered a freeze option immediately; d) There should be more South-North Summits and US-North Summits; e) South Korea should seek to engage in bi-lateral talks with the North on the nuclear issue unless US can start to show more flexibility; f) South Korea and US should state clearly their policy goals vis-a-vis North Korea and if they are not a match, they should pursue their separate paths. Just as an aside, in the article he describes James Kelly's visit to North Korea as POMPOUS. Its comments and words like that that makes reading these papers so worthwhile. I know what that word means but I have no idea its purpose in this context. If I was Kelly I’d be flattered. Leon Sigal Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, Social Science Research Council An Instinct for the Capillaries This paper, also provocative, sees the US policy as misguided and useless. Like the previous paper he advocates bi-lateral discussions and views the sanctions are negative. He argues that the profits from illicit activities are exaggerated and that the increase in trade from South Korea and China is further diminishing its overall worth to the regime. Therefore, the main work of the IAI is to prevent any success through negotiations rather than to squeeze the North. He also argues strongly against the US hardline policy advocating no bi-lateral interaction with North Korea. For five years [the US] have huffed and puffed but failed to blow Kim Jong-il's house down. Instead, all their hot air has succeeded only in thawing North Korea's frozen plutonium program.He blames hardliners in the US for taking options and, like the previous paper, recommend that the US first settle for a freeze before trying to make further progress. Sunday, June 04, 2006
English Civil War Re-enactment - Longford Hall Last weekend I joined the English Civil War Society in Newport, Shropshire. The event was held on the grounds of Longford Hall, which is now a part of a school. This was a major muster so there were plenty of groups from both the Parliamentarian and Royal sides. I was part of the Earl of Essex Regiment and they are easily spotted by their orange coats (as the photos will reveal). It has been many years since I've been camping and my first time to camp in UK. Needless to say I spent most of the weekend in multiple layers of clothing grumbling about the cold. I was particularly annoyed by the British people who insisted on parading around in t-shirts and sandals. Fortunately the weekend featured plenty of beer and port to keep the spirit warm. On the first day of the muster I joined in as a pikeman. The pike is a horribly heavy weapon, especially when you are a weak and scrawny like me. I spent the morning with my Ensign going through some basic commands and proper handling of the pike. In the afternoon I joined the regiment in the battle re-enactment. However, I was too sore and sorry for myself to repeat the effort the next day. I opted to take some pictures:  This is a cannon. Musketeers from the Royalist army. An intense battle between opposing pike blocks from the royalist and parliamentarian armies. The musketeers from the Essex regiment leaves the battlefield
Luncheon Address by the Honorable James Kelly, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs This post follows on from the previous summary of session one from the Seoul-Washington Forum held at the Brookings Institute May 1-2, 2006. The transcript from Kelly's luncheon address is based on a tape-recording. This would indicate that his talk was based off a few talking points rather than from a prepared speech. Accordingly, it lacks something in structure but the main topic is North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Not surprisingly he adamantly opposes acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power. We do not and must not accept North Korean nuclear weapons, even if there will be no quick solutions.He goes on to stress the unattractiveness of any military solution and advocates diplomacy as the way forward. He emphasizes that no solution can be reached without active participation of South Korea arguing that it is the country with most interested in what happens with North Korea. He sees some positive signs in how things are proceeding more generally in North Korea. He notes an increase in business relations, civilian and military, between China and North Korea. He also sees the on-going dialogue between South and North Korea as being broadly positive. However he does caution that South Korea's eagerness to be friendly with North Korea does not always lead to prudent moves. This comment is in relation to political payments the South has made to North Korea such as for the 2001 Summit meeting. He states: South Korea is understandably reluctant to have tensions rise, if only for the blow that that would be to its life and economy. But it needs to be firm and patient with North Korea. Sometimes it seems that Seoul lets its desire for peaceful comity get a little ahead of the situation the ground.He concludes his speech by expressing that US-ROK relations stand to benefit from an FTA but that it remains to be seen how the negotiations for that will pan out. The transcript also includes the Q&A session that followed Kelly's talk. The first couple of questions focus on the difference between regime change and regime transformation with Kelly (rightly) pointing out that transformation would be for the existing leaders to initiate reforms while regime change would involve changing the leadership. Don Oberdorfer asks about US reluctance to talk directly to the DPRK but Kelly reflects this by emphasising that US does talk to the DPRK and anyway, multilateral talks are better than bi-lateral. Other questions focus on US-ROK relations and US-DPRK relations from the viewpoint of US foreign policy toward each of these countries. The final question asks whether the US should have an opinion on Dokdo and Kelly (rightly) reiterated what Michael Green (see session one summary) had said that the US should stand clear and not have any opinion about what is a bi-lateral dispute. Saturday, June 03, 2006
Birthday Trip to Brighton As mentioned earlier, for my recent birthday I made a trip down to Brighton. Unfortunately it was the most miserable day weather-wise that we had encountered in a long while. This meant that there was little point to take many photos. As you can see below I decided the day was so colourless that I took the two scenery pictures in black and white to better catch the mood.  This is a picture of the Pavilion, which is the awesome summer palace of the Prince Regent. After visiting the Pavilion we stopped by the museum to see an exhibition of Rex Whistler works. This was way better than I had expected and well worth seeing.  And this is the Brighton Pier - the one that burned down. Looking all grey and miserable in the bleak weather. The other pier which is not burned down is full of rides and food stalls and has a large arcade for games. It was in the arcade that I decided to try that game where the claw tries to pick up a toy. I always figured these were rigged but I won on my first go; a big floppy-eared soft-toy rabbit.  For any Australian I think one of the key highlights of Brighton is going to be the pebble beach. I found it fascinating and if it hadn't been blowing a gale I would've spent more time just staring at it.  In all it was a pretty good way to spend a birthday and obviously the day finished at the pub with a few celebratory beers. Seoul-Washington Forum A Seoul-Washington Forum was held at the beginning of May at the Brookings Institute. The website has put up the papers, which make for an interesting read, from this event. The issues covered are the US-ROK Alliance, the Six-party Talks, military self-reliance in the ROK, and US-ROK economic cooperation. So far I have only summarised the papers from session one. There are three other sessions and two luncheon addresses (one for each day) by James Kelly and Christopher Hill respectively. Your options from here are to: a) read session one' s summary below and then wait and see if I get around to summarising the rest of the papers; b) forget about waiting and go and read them yourself; or c) just don't bother at all about any of it. Michael Green, "The Case for the US-ROK Alliance" This paper distinguishes between 'objective realities' of the US-ROK alliance and 'constructed realities' of the alliance. The three main areas of dispute in the alliance within the objective versus constructed realities framework are: a) divergence over North Korea; b) divergence over Japan and China; and c) divergence over command relationships and leadership in alliance. The objective realities assess the accomplishments of the alliance to date and views the state of the alliance from the perspective that all alliances undergo change to suit evolving circumstances and that there may be rough as well as good times in any alliance. From this perspective the US-ROK alliance is similar to most alliances and possibly better than some. However, the constructed objective considers how the alliance is portrayed in media or by politicians and how it is subsequently viewed by the public. Obviously the constructed reality of the alliance is quite different to the objective reality. In the case of the US-ROK alliance you have South Korean politicians getting short-term political gain from bad-mouthing the alliance, you have the American politicians complaining about South Korean recalcitrance and you have the North Koreans over-emphasising the threat of the US to peace and security on the peninsula. In the conclusion he states: Reviewing the major sources of tension in the U.S.-ROK alliance relationship today, one is struck at how many of the problems are ideational or constructed in nature. The areas of divergence are not the result of a differentiation in the objective material security threats we each face. Rather, it is how those common threats are interpreted in each side's changing domestic political cultures, and particularly on the ROK side. The task for those in leadership is to articulate a future vision for the alliance based on a realistic assessment of the threats we face and an agenda that draws on our common values as democracies and our peoples' respective aspirations.His recommends some practical steps that the US might take in order to de-emphasis some of the constructed realities. These suggestions sounded quite practical to me and his assertion that US should stay well clear of any Japan-Korea diplomatic disputes, whether it be Yasukuni Shrine or Dokdo, were right on the mark. And coming in at only nine pages, this is a concise article that is easy to read. Park Kun Young, "A Future of US-Korea Alliance: Toward a Mature Allied Partnership for Peace in Northeast Asia and Beyond" From the outset I didn't like this article. The purpose of the US-Korea alliance is poorly defined from the beginning. It follows that an essay giving policy prescriptions for an alliance, whose purpose is unclear, will lack focus or meaning. In the introduction it states that, the U.S.-Korea alliance has been a great success in terms of preventing a war on Korean peninsula and promoting economic development and democracy in Korea.The paper then says it will give policy recommendations that will allow the US-ROK alliance to lead peace in Northeast Asia and beyond. Preventing war and promoting economic development and democracy are not the same thing as leading regional and global peace. Although I am willing to be wrong, my understanding is the US-ROK alliance is a KASA i.e: Korea-America Security Alliance. Even though it could be argued that, providing a secure environment should allow for economic and political development, the US-ROK alliance does not expressly include economic or democratic growth as an objective. The alliance is a military one. It seems like the author is aligning the US-ROK alliance with 'the relationship between the US and South Korea'. This is not the case. And I certainly don't think that the US-ROK alliance has aims to 'lead peace' beyond Northeast Asia. The first prescription is to stabilize and strengthen the political relationship. The author argues that the blame for the current poor relationship rests with US and lists grievance going back as early as 1904, well before the alliance was even in existence. What I especially don't like here is the argument that the US should rush to rectify its image and better understand the root causes of anti-American sentiment in Korea if it hopes to have a positive relationship in Korea. I am not a huge fan of America but I think calling on America to placate public opinion in Korea is not what should be done here. Surely burden lies on the South Korean politicians to educate the South Korean public on why the alliance is good for their country. If nobody, neither the politicians nor the public sees any value in the alliance with America then it is time to cut the ties; not for America to do some PR. The second prescription is to address ambiguity in the Mutual Defense Treaty. Not knowing much about it, I have little comment. Except to say that this prescription, like the first one, appears to blame the US without analysing what steps South Korea should also be taking. The third suggestion is to expand the alliance into a multilateral regional peace arrangement. It seems odd to suggest this when the entire article has shown how difficult it is to have an agreement between two countries, let alone a whole bunch. The general ill-feeling between major regional powers in Northeast Asia, the fact that US already has an alliance with Japan and is unlikely to get one with China also negates the validity of this policy recommendation. Bruce Cumings, "Ending the ROK-US Alliance?" Although the topic was supposed to be about the possibly of ending the alliance, the article chooses to focus on why ending the alliance is almost inconceivable. This article gives a full account of issues in the US-ROK alliance focusing on events during the past decade. As most people know, Mr. Cumings tends not to favour US policy toward North Korea and South Korea. And this article is no exception. The US is portrayed as being mostly arrogant and ignorant in its policy toward both South and North Korea. Not surprisingly he sees the US as the main reason for the current strained relationship in the alliance. This article is similar in argument to the previous article in that it aims to demonstrate that strained relations are mostly the fault of the US' unilateral policy and attitude toward the North. Exacerbating this is the fact that the US policy is in contradiction to South Korea's own view on how North Korea should be handled. The divergent policies are fanning the rise of anti-Americanism in South Korea, which in turn i s weakening the alliance. Mr. Cumings' article however is better writtenargumentarguement is much more compelling than the previous paper. Moon Chung-In, "Re-thinking the Future of the ROK-US Alliance" This article tries to emphasise the continuing validity of the alliance. He points out that sentiment against US foreign policy should not mean that South Korea does not appreciate and respect the US. As he states: But it should be reminded that as in the U.S., South Korea is a pluralistic society and its people share diverse perceptions of the United States. Banmi (anti-American) is only one aspect of South Korea's national psyche, as there are, in fact, a variety of Korean positions toward the United States, ranging from chinmi (pro-American) and sungmi (worship America) to hyommi (loathing America). Those who attempted to tear down the MacArthur statue represent only a tiny segment of the Korean population. A great majority of Koreans still remember the U.S. role as a savior and remain grateful.He argues that the success/failure of the alliance should not be based on the recent protests in South Korea but judged on the achievements of the alliance. From this perspective, as the first article summarized also argued, the alliance is, and continues to be, a success. He also recognizes challenges to the future of that alliance including China and the dynamic nature of Asian politics and the rapid evolution of socio-economic circumstances in Asia. He also notes the command relationship and disputes over cost sharing, public perceptions in Korea of the US, and the divergent threat perception of North Korea. He concludes that any alliance should be seen as an instrument for enhancing national interest and the core problem would be if one or both nation can't see that value in the existing alliance. Friday, May 26, 2006
Lazy on the Blogging Front I have been slack on the blogging front. It feels like I've been busy but can't quite figure out what it was that made me busy. The daily occurrences of life I expect. I went to Brighton last weekend for my birthday (happy b'day to me!) and the weekend before that I was the official minute taker for an Amnesty International meeting. Time gets away from you when the weekends are busy. And this weekend I am going...wait for this...reenacting. That's right, dressed up for the British civil war (Parliamentarian) I am going to spend Friday to Monday camping - authentically - somewhere north of Birmingham. On Sunday and Monday we will reenact some civil war battle with some regiment of the King's army. I am armed with a camera and plan to document the event. That is if I don't die of cold. In addition to that post I also have a couple of draft posts nearly ready so hopefully the next couple of weeks will see much more blogging that the last couple. In sad news I read that the Flying Yangban is shutting down. He informs us that he will still be blogging via the Marmot but its not quite the same. I like and read the Marmot's site regularly but its has SO much stuff, it is easy to miss or just glance over posts on that site. Wednesday, May 10, 2006
The Rational Choice for Developing Nuclear Weapons (or "How to read an article you don't agree with in a constructive way") Is North Korea's decision to develop nuclear weapons rational or not? This question is simple enough. Yet is seems to encourage a lot of bickering and misunderstanding. The latest round has developed over Gaven McCormack's recent article in the Asia Times. I read this article and then I read the Korean Liberators rebuttal. And then I was confused. My confusion was partly solved when I realised that KL starts by rebutting the article at hand but then dives much deeper and criticises other articles by Mr. McCormack. For future readability, I would humbly recommend to the KL that he start similar posts with a reading list so that we can know in advance what articles are under scrutiny. From the start let me clarify that this entry goes through Mr. McCormack's current article in the Asia Times and parts of the KL's rebuttal only. It does not venture into other works or critcisms on other works. My entry is based on the assumption that Mr. McCormack's article is asking the question that I started with and is not, as KL seems to think an article defending North Korea’s nuclear program. By doing this I aim to highlight what I see as erroneous comments against Mr. McCormack's article. I hope this will bring the discussion back to a level where constructive argument from both sides can be addressed in a reasonable manner. The Asia Times' article begins by noting the failure of the NPT in stopping nuclear proliferation. He says that, In May 2005, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference collapsed in failure. . . Responsibility was equally shared by the established nuclear powers whose hypocrisy discredited the system and those outside the club seeking to justify themselves according to the superpower principle: without nuclear weapons there is no security.Quote with emphasis taken from KL. In the Asia Times' article Mr. McCormack goes on to point out examples to support this claim. These examples include the fact that the NPT signatories turn a blind eye to Israel's nuclear program; that India, despite not joining the NPT have become recognised and accepted nuclear states eligible to receive (civilian) nuclear technology; that nuclear arsenals are increasing, notably in the US despite commitments to decrease stocks. And then you have countries like Japan which follow the letter of the agreement by not having nuclear weapons but not quite the spirit since they have everything ready to go the minute they change their mind. Confusion may now start to set in if you read KL's post. The next part of the quote taken by the KL from the Asia Times reads: [Rather than North Korea] The "problem" is the United States, and the half century of hostile, violent and always intimidating confrontation from the intervention that divided Korea in 1945 and the devastating war of 1950 to 1953 to the hostility that continues to this day.To which KL adds the comments: The "America-made-North-Korea-do-it," argument. Rather ironic ? and problematic for that position, as circular logic often is ? that those nations currently under the most pressure, the "Axis of Evil," oddly enough, would not be in such situations if not for their illicit weapons programs.Firstly, in the Asia Times' article this second quote appears twelve paragraphs after the first quote. So the second qutoe in fact is not discussing the failures and problems with the NPT. Nor, is it saying that 'the "problem" is the United States'. The reason the word problem is in inverted commas is because the article is discussing what North Korea thinks is the problem. In other words, Mr. McCormack is not saying that "America-made-North-Korea-do-it". He is saying that North Korea perceives that America has driven them to develop nuclear weapons in the name of self-defense. Preceding KL's quote is an important phrase which he has opted to omit. But one which I think is critical to understanding what is being argued: from North Korea the world looks very different. The "problem" is the United States, and the half century of hostile, violent and always intimidating confrontation from the intervention that divided Korea in 1945 and the devastating war of 1950 to 1953 to the hostility that continues to this day.It should also be noted that the quote comes under the section "The Problem of Perspective," which I think re-emphasises that the point being made is one of perception, not fact. The argument of Mr. McCormack is simple and not new. It states that condemning North Korea as an irrational player who is entirely to blame for its own nuclear program is erroneous. Rather, it is more productive for the western world to see the rationality behind North Korea’s decision in order to better understand how why the choice was made and how the West can better coax North Korea to a different path. Or indeed if there is any point trying to do so. This article addresses what those grievances are/might be and it shouldn’t be dismissed or criticized simply because it suggests that US should consider how its own actions may be interpreted by North Korea. At this point the KL gives up with article at hand and goes into the other readings. I am too lazy to read them (the links to the other, long articles) so I won't address his comments to the other articles.
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