Thursday, March 22, 2007
Why the Rush? Very unsurprisingly the six-party talks are running into a spot of bother. The North Koreans are insisting that the money from the Macau Bank be transferred to a China bank before any more talks occur. They walked out until this happens. In the meantime, the Japan-DPRK bi-lateral chat also didn't go well and were cut short. These delays are putting strain on an already tight deadline. The crux of the problem, as I see it, is the 60 day marker date. After years of negotiations and delays and walk outs it logically follows that the next phase is going to progress in a similar way; ie; slowly. Saying that so many things are going to be done in 60 days may make sense in terms of wanting to show commitment and to get a positive start on things. However, in makes no sense in the context of negotiations with DPRK to think that anything is going to happen quickly and smoothly. By setting a much more generous time-line the negotiators would have more time to smooth things out when disagreements arise and to allow time to handle any dispute that may come up (such as now). Conversely, if things did go smoothly and quickly, it wouldn't stop groups getting things done ahead of schedule. Sixty days is too tight a deadline for the kind of complex negotiations that are still needed in the six-party forum (and the smaller working groups). After so many years of absolutely no progress we can surely afford to be careful and slow in this new phase. Stressing everyone out with tight deadlines seems very counterproductive in this setting. Instead of sixty-days maybe a year would make more sense. It will probably end up taking that long anyway. Just as an aside: after reading some other blogs, notably DPRK Studies and One Free Korea (see side for links) I would like to clarify my negativity. I do NOT think that the failure of these talks is inevitable; I think it is likely but not inevitable. I think the two greatest threats to progress are the deadlines set (60 days) and Japan's focus on abductees, which I believe is isolating them and setting a precedent for countries to pull out over specific domestic concerns at the expense of the greater goal that needs to be achieved. That said, these are not insurmountable and we already know that DPRK will make things difficult. By being aware of the dangers and likely stumbling blocs in advance there is no reason for these talks to fail in the same way the Agreed Framework did.
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Tuesday, March 20, 2007
New Link - a blog focusing on migrant workers A very useful comment was posted alerting me to a blog that is interested in migrant workers in Korea. I have added it to the side bar. - Two Koreas. As some readers may know, South Korea has a poor record in its treatment of migrant workers. This became tragically evident when the Yeosu Immigration Detention Centre went up in flames killing about 9 detainees. This could easily have been avoided (or mitigated) had the right number of guards been on duty, had the fire and safety equipment worked and had the guards been more alert to their duties in ensuring the safe and timely evacuation on the detainees. Possibly the worst part of this story is the government's attempts to blame the fire on a detainee (who persihed) rather than to use this tragedy as a catalyst for improving conditions in all immigration detention centers and perhaps rethinking their approach to detention of migrant workers ie: arbitrary detention and deportation of undocument migrant workers. Tuesday, March 13, 2007
In Your own Words A webcast of Christopher Hill speaking about the recent agreement with North Korea and what it is and what it isn't, is available at the Brookings website. There is also mention of a new publication by Jack Pritchard coming out soon. There is a sixty day 'To Do' list for initial progress. In the first thirty days there should be a meeting of each of the working groups: a denuclearistion working group, an economic and energy working group, a Northeast Asia security working group and two bi-lateral groups (US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK). There is also a plan to do something on the Banco Delta Asia Bank in Macau. We already know that DPRK is hoping to see that latter issue resolved very quickly. In addition to the meetings, in the sixty days the reactors should be shut and sealed, international observers should be on the ground in DPRK and the denuclearisation group should have a finalised list all DPRK nuclear programs. There should be some progress in each of the working groups and the first shipment of 50,000 tons of oil should be done. That would conclude the first-phase. The post-60 days phase would include further oil shipments (950,000 tons) over a period of time. Interestingly, there is a cost-sharing arrangement for these shipments that Japan has opted out of until they see how things develop. I suspect that progress for them depends a great deal on progess in the abductions issue. The full DPRK list of its nuclear programs to abandon would be finalised and agreed on, and DPRK would disable (not just shut but fully put out of commission) existing facilities. The Q&A part, which is the bulk of the webcast is very interesting as well. Sunday, March 11, 2007
Fatty Butter!? Japan's Education Minister has likened human rights with fatty butter. Too much fatty butter will cause a metabolic disorder. One presume that he means that too much respect for the protection of the rights of inidivuals will make a nation sick. How full protection of human rights can cause national-level illness was not explained. I'm not sure what is meant here by 'fatty' butter. Does he mean butter that is not 'fat reduced' or 'lite' or something like that? If he is referring to natural full milk, creamy butter as 'fatty' then I take even greater offense at his comments. The comments are a disconcerting glance into the state of human rights education in Japan. Its also worrying that the Education Minister mentioned 'only' eating fatty butter. I don't think its good for the Education Minister to be so idiotic to think that anyone would only eat fatty butter. Or that using food and human rights in a analogy makes any sense. Tuesday, March 06, 2007
Peace with North Korea - doomed to fail? There has been quite a bit of optimism of late over the recent 'breakthrough' in the six-party negotiations. North Korea's Kim Kye Gwan is visiting New York to hash out more of the details with Christopher Hill and all seems to be go. At least for now.... Black clouds, however, are beginning to descend ominously on the horizon. Firstly are the pessimists who claim this agreement is not different, or not different enough, from the Agreed Framework, which ended quite badly. Another is speculation over what the inspectors may find in Korea when they get there and whether we are now going to be subject to a 'play-down' in the seriousness of the threat that has presumably loomed over our heads these past years. And the third one comes from the interesting paragraph at the end of the article: Washington’s suggestion that it may drop North Korea from its state sponsors of terrorism list if negotiations go well has raised concern with Tokyo.. Japan has urged the United States not to remove North Korea from the list until it provides an explanation for the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents during the 1970s and 1980s. Japan insists it will not participate in the Six-Party Talk aid package to North Korea until the abduction issue is resolvedThis presents a problem all too similar to one that contributed to the demise of the Agreed Framework. I refer to squabbles and conditionality imposed by the supposed allies upon eacth other. Insisting that progress can't be made until the Government of Japan becomes a domestic hero is highly unreasonable. Moreso because emotional cases like the abduction never have an 'explanation' that is going to be truly acceptable. Comfort Women Occidentalism has got a LONG post about the current push to pass a resolution in the US Congress (non-binding) to tell the Government of Japan to apologise for the military sexual slavery system run during the Pacific War, otherwise known as Comfort Women (CW). He and a link to Ampontan, who is quoted a length and linked, do not seem overly supportive of this resolution for a variety of reasons: the woman testifying is a liar (or has a bad memory); the translation of the GofJ's statement on the issue was poorly done and did not adequately reflect the sentiments intended; Japan is an ally of America so they shouldn't say anything that might upset them. These sorry excuses for insightful posting are a real shame.
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